

Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO BEIRUT JIDDA FROM
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QUOTE

S E C R E T KHARTOUM 2430

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, SU

SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION: SUDANESE VIEWS

BEGIN SUMMARY: ASSTSEC NEWSOM, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR
AND AF/N DIRECTOR BLAKE, CALLED ON PRESIDENT NIMEIRI NOV. 10
TO DESCRIBE US INVOLVEMENT MIDDLE EAST AND US OBJECTIVES.
ACTING FONMIN AL-HAJ MUSA AND FONOFF UNDERSEC FADL OBEID
ALSO PRESENT. NEWSOM STRESSED US EFFORTS TOWARD CEASE FIRE
AND DETERMINATION UTILIZE PRESENT SITUATION TO SEEK JUST AND
LASTING PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST. EXPRESSED HOPE THAT GOS AND
OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS WOULD SHOW PATIENCE DURING LONG AND
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DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS WHICH LIE AHEAD. NEWSOM ALSO
EMPHASIZED SERIOUS PROBLEM CONTINUATION OIL BOYCOTT COULD
POSE FOR US ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN SEARCH FOR MIDDLE EAST
SOLUTION. NIMEIRI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION US EFFORTS FOR

CEASE FIRE AND HOPE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM WOULD NOW FINALLY BE SETTLED. COMMENTED THAT UNTIL VERY RECENTLY HE HAD NOT BEEN CONTACTED BY ANY ARAB HEAD OF STATE RE MIDDLE EAST WAR AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS. NIMEIRI EXPRESSED SUDANESE CONCERN WITH ADVERSE IMPACT ON OIL EMBARGO ON NATIONAL ECONOMY. ALTHOUGH NIMEIRI DESCRIBED GOS MIDDLE EAST POLICY IN STANDARD ARAB TERMS HE REFLECTED WILLINGNESS TO HAVE SUDAN PLAY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN ARAB AND AFRICAN COUNCILS. END SUMMARY.

1. AFTER EXCHANGE OF AMENITIES, ASST. SEC NEWSOM EXPLAINED REASON FOR HIS VISIT SUDAN, EMPHASIZING GREAT IMPORTANCE USG ATTACHED TO HAVING OTHER GOVERNMENTS FULLY UNDERSTAND US OBJECTIVES AND US INVOLVEMENT IN CURRENT MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. NEWSOM EMPHASIZED NO MILITARY UNITS OF US HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THE WAR, US HAD ONLY BEGUN RESUPPLY OF ISRAEL AFTER MASSIVE SOVIET SHIPMENTS TO ARABS BECAME EVIDENT AND THAT US WAS COMMITTED TO SECURITY AND INDEPENDENCE ISRAEL BUT NOT TO ITS TERRITORIAL EXPANSION. HOWEVER, US COULD NOT RPT NOT STAND IDLY BY DURING WAR IF EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL THREATENED.

2. NEWSOM NOTED THAT ONCE OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING BEGAN US HAD TWO OBJECTIVES: (A) CEASE FIRE, AND (B) MOVEMENT TOWARD JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT OF MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. US BELIEVES RECENT WAR HAD CREATED SITUATION DIFFERENT FROM 1967. ARABS HAD RECOVERED THEIR HONOR, ISRAELIS HAD LEARNED THAT MILITARY SUPERIORITY COULD NOT ENSURE THEIR CONTINUED PEACEFUL EXISTENCE, AND DETENTE NOW EXISTS BETWEEN US AND USSR WHICH WAS NOT CASE IN 1967. FINALLY, SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338 HAD ESTABLISHED BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH CONFLICT.

3. LOOKING AHEAD, US SAW THREE KEY PROBLEMS. FIRST IS OIL EMBARGO IMPOSED BY ARAB STATES AGAINST US. IF EMBARGO CONTINUED IT COULD BE ITS IMPACT POLITICALLY IN US HAVE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON EFFORTS OF PRESIDENT AND SECSTATE TO FIND PEACEFUL
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SOLUTION TO MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. SECOND PROBLEM WAS NEED TO GIVE PARTIES IN UPCOMING NEGOTIATIONS MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY, AND NOT RPT NOT HAVE THEM BOUND BY RESOLUTIONS IN ARAB SUMMIT OR OAU WHICH WOULD MAKE ATTEMPTS OF EGYPT, JORDAN AND SYRIA TO NEGOTIATE MORE DIFFICULT. NEWSOM REMINDED NIMEIRI OF HOW DIFFICULT LATTER'S OWN NEGOTIATIONS WITH SUDANESE SOUTHERNERS HAD BEEN, AND NEED AT THAT TIME OF AVOIDING AT OUTSET RIGID POSITIONS WHICH WOULD HAVE MADE PROGRESS TOWARD SETTLEMENT IMPOSSIBLE. THIRD CONSIDERATION WAS US RECOGNITION THAT PALESTINIAN FACTOR IN PROBLEM MUST BE TAKEN FULLY INTO ACCOUNT. HOWEVER, NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO SETTLEMENT MUST BEGIN AMONG GOVERNMENTS WITH DOOR LEFT OPEN FOR PALESTINIANS AT APPROPRIATE TIME.

4. IN REPLY, NIMEIRI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION OF US EFFORTS WHICH HAD RESULTED IN CEASE FIRE. HE STATED THAT UNTIL LAST 48 HOURS NO RPT NO ARAB HEAD OF STATE HAD CONTACTED SUDAN RE MIDDLE EAST. AT OUTBREAK OF WAR NIMEIRI HAD CALLED SADAT TO WISH HIM SUCCESS AND TO OFFER SUDANESE ASSISTANCE. HOWEVER, SINCE WAR BEGAN SUDANESE HAD BEEN DEPENDENT FOR THEIR INFORMATION ON MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS ON FACT SUDAN MEMBER UNSC, ON THEIR UN PERMREP, AND ON THEIR MISSIONS IN ARAB AND OTHER WORLD CAPITALS.

5. NIMEIRI STATED THAT HE FIRST THOUGHT WAR WAS RESULT OF COLLUSION BETWEEN US AND SOVIET UNION TO FORCE MIDDLE EAST ANTAGONISTS INTO SETTLEMENT OF MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. HE HAD ALSO WONDERED WHETHER US MIGHT HAVE COOPERATED WITH ARAB STATES TO FORCE ISRAEL TO GIVE UP OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, OR WHETHER WAR WAS RESULT OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN SYRIA, EGYPT AND JORDAN. FINALLY, HE HAD ALSO WONDERED WHETHER SOVIET UNION HAD GIVEN ARMS TO THE ARABS AS ENCOURAGEMENT TO BEGIN WAR WHICH WOULD LEAD TO FAST VICTORY. NIMEIRI INDICATED THAT GOS HAD SUPPORTED ARAB CAUSE IN RECENT CONFLICT BECAUSE OF COMMITMENTS MADE AFTER 1967 WAR. HE PERSONALLY DID NOT LIKE IDEA OF SENDING "SYMBOLIC" TROOPS IF ONLY BECAUSE ISRAEL HAD CLAIMED AFTER 1967 WAR THAT IT HAD DEFEATED "13 ARAB COUNTRIES" WHICH CERTAINLY WAS NOT THE CASE INASMUCH AS SUDAN HAD NOT BEEN ACTIVELY ENGAGED. CONCLUDING, NIMEIRI STATED SUDANESE POLICY IN FOLLOWING TERMS: OPPOSITION TO RETENTION BY ANY GOVERN-
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MENT OF TERRITORIES WON BY FORCE; NEED TO CORRECT SITUATION WHICH HAD EXILED PALESTINIAN PEOPLE FROM THEIR HOMELAND; AND FINALLY, NEED TO END ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF MOSLEM HOLY PLACES.

6. RE OIL EMBARGE NIMEIRI STATED GOS DID NOT KNOW WHAT OIL WAS USED AS WEAPON BY ARABS AND WHO WAS THE BENEFICIARY OF THIS POLICY, ESPECIALLY WHEN USE OF OIL AS WEAPON HAD BEEN REJECTED BEFORE THE WAR. IN HIS JUDGMENT, THE OUTCOME OF THE RECENT CONFLICT INsofar AS ARABS ARE CONCERNED HAD NOT RESULTED IN ANY MILITARY VICTORY. BEFORE THE WAR THE ARAB POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC SITUATION HAD BEEN BETTER AS HAD BEEN THE ARAB MORAL POSITION. SUDAN HAD FAVORED A CEASE FIRE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL BECAUSE OF THE GREAT RISK OF AN CONFRONTATION LEADING TO WAR BETWEEN THE SUPER POWERS WHICH "ONLY THE ARABS WOULD LOSE", EVEN THOUGH AT THE TIME HE, NIMEIRI, BELIEVED THAT THE WAR WAS THE RESULT OF SUPER POWER COLLUSION. (WHEN NEWSOM ASKED WHETHER NIMEIRI STILL BELIEVED THIS TO BE THE CASE, HE SMILED AND LAUGHED.)

7. NEWSOM RECALLED HOW SECRETARY HAD LEARNED OF

LIKELIHOOD HOSTILITIES ONLY FEW HOURS BEFORE OUTBREAK. NEITHER US NOR ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ACCURATELY FORECAST OUTBREAK. NEVERTHELESS, US REGARDED PRESENT SITUATION AS OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT OF PROBLEM. NIMEIRI REPLIED THAT GOS APPRECIATED EFFORTS OF SECRETARY KISSINGER WHICH HAD RESULTED IN CEASE FIRE AND THE COOPERATION OF THE SUPER POWERS WHICH IT HAD SUPPORTED. HE STRESSED THAT NOBODY IN PRESENT SITUATION WOULD SPEAK FOR GOS EXCEPT GOS ITSELF AND THAT USG SHOULD IGNORE STATEMENTS CLAIMING TO REPRESENT "VIEWS OF ALL ARAB NATIONS". UNLESS GOS IDENTIFICATION WITH THEM WAS CLEAR.

8. REVERTING TO OIL EMBARGO, NEWSOM RECALLED COMMENTS OF OAU DESECEN ONU IN ADDIS THAT EMBARGO FOR AFRICAN STATES MIGHT WELL BE "TWO-EDGED SWORD". NIMEIRI AGREED AND NOTED THAT SUDAN HAD ONLY THREE DAY SUPPLY OF OIL ON HAND AND SUFFERED SERIOUS FINANCIAL LOSSES AS RESULT OF INCREASE IN OIL PRICES TRIGGERED BY ARAB STATES BUT FOLLOWED BY
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IRAN, WHICH IS SUDAN'S SUPPLIER.

9. NEWSOM EXPRESSED HOPE SUDAN AND OTHER ARAB STATES WOULD HAVE PATIENCE IN COMING WEEKS AND MONTHS DURING WHICH ATTEMPTS WERE BEING MADE TO WORK OUT SOLUTION IN MIDDLE EAST. NIMEIRI HAD REFERRED TO RISK OF CONFRONTATION OF SUPER POWERS. USG IS WELL AWARE OF THAT RISK AND DANGER OF ACCIDENTS OCCURRING WHICH NEITHER WE NOR SOVIET UNION WOULD WANT; HENCE OUR CONTINUING INVOLVEMENT IN QUEST FOR SOLUTION TO MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. FINALLY, NEWSOM STRESSED THAT US, BECAUSE OF ITS CONTACTS WITH BOTH ISRAELIS AND ARABS, IS INDISPENSABLE IF PEACE IS TO BE ESTABLISHED. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT OTHERS WILL NOT HAVE ROLE TO PLAY AND US WILL CONTINUE TO UTILIZE UN IN ITS EFFORTS.

10. CONCLUDING THIS PART OF CONVERSATION, NIMEIRI EMPHASIZED SUDAN WILLINGNESS TO PLAY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN SEARCH FOR JUST AND DURABLE PEACE AND STRESSED GOS COULD BE HELPFUL IN BOTH ARAB AND AFRICAN WORLD. NEWSOM SAID HE HAD NO SPECIFIC SUGGESTION BUT HOPED FRIENDLY COUNTRIES LIKE SUDAN WOULD PLAY MODERATING ROLE AT OAU FONMINS AND ARAB SUMMIT MEETINGS, LEST UNHELPFUL EMOTIONAL APPEALS DOMINATE PROCEEDINGS. NEWSOM ALSO ASSURED NIMEIRI THAT US WOULD CONTINUE TO KEEP GOS INFORMED THROUGH AMBASSADOR.

BREWER

UNQUOTE RUSH

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